

S E C R E T

27 October 1959


MEMORANDUM FOR: Projects Review Committee

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : Establishment of FBID West African Bureau

The attached project to cover the cost of the establishment of an FBID West African Monitoring Station in Nigeria is forwarded for consideration.

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Assistant Director for Operations

ATTACHMENT

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PROJECT OUTLINE

Project West African Monitoring Station 25X1
 Identification: FBIS - Kaduna 25X1
Amendment No. NA

Originating Division: FBID/00
a. Division Chief: 25X1
b. Staff Chief: 25X1
 25X1

Target Area: West Africa, south of the Sahara as far east
as the Chad Basin and the Cameroons, and the
Congo Basin of Central Africa.

Type of Project: Broadcast Monitoring 25X1
Financial Mechanism: Project 25X1
funds for operation through FY 1961 and
budgeted funds thereafter.

Funds Requested: 25X1

Current Status: New

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1. OBJECTIVE:

To establish an FBID African monitoring station to cover West and Central African broadcasts.

2. ORIGIN:

FBID, as a service of common concern under a mission assigned to CIA by NSCID-2, meets requirements for intelligence information through monitoring of radio broadcasts. Lack of facilities within the range of West and Central African broadcasting stations prevents FBID from meeting the requirements of its mission in this increasingly important area.

3. SITUATION:

Background: In late 1956 FBID conducted a field survey of reception of African broadcast stations from various points, which indicated that Accra, Gold Coast was the best technical location for a West African monitoring station (Tab A). It also showed that the best monitoring site for North Africa would be the west Mediterranean island of Mallorca, and that the most practical East African location would be Asmara. Southern Africa was not surveyed. As it became clear that each sector constituted a distinct monitoring area not satisfactorily covered by another, a poll was made in 1957 of potential consumers within the intelligence community to determine their need for increased information from the various African areas. Results of the poll showed that, at that time, interest was too scattered among the areas to justify the establishment of a station. On the recommendation of several consumers, the community was polled again in 1958. Results of this poll (Tab B) indicated that the trend toward independence of the West African colonies had created a strong demand for increased information through monitoring of that area.

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Concurrently FBID began to pressure the BBC Monitoring Service to investigate the possibility of establishing a BBC East African monitoring station. The 1956 FBID survey had indicated the Nairobi area might be an optimum location for East Africa, and the BBC displayed considerable interest in the matter, pleading only lack of funds. In late 1958 BBC advised informally that H.M.G. looked favorably upon the project and authorized a field survey at Nairobi. In early July 1959 the Head of the BBC Monitoring Service informally advised FBID that the composition of the East African Unit had been decided upon and actual site selection was imminent.

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4. PROPOSAL:

It is proposed that FBID establish a West African Bureau at Kaduna, Nigeria, as an adjunct to the American Consulate, Kaduna.

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5. OPERATIONAL OUTLINE:

a. A tentative timetable has been established for the project to enable the proposed goal:

* It is illegal for foreigners to own land in Nigeria; however foreigners are permitted to engage in long-term leases of 40 and 99 years. The U.S. Consulate at Kaduna, established during the past year in rented space, is currently constructing permanent quarters under a 99 year lease.

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- 30 October 1959 - Submission of construction specifications by FBID to RE&CD/OL.
- 15 November 1959 - Formal request to Department of State.
- 15 December 1959 - Completion of building plans by RE&CD/OL.
- 2 January 1960 - Begin planning of Materiel procurement.
- 15 January 1960 - British-Nigerian approval.
- 1 February 1960 - Advance party to Nigeria.
- 1 March 1960 - Deadline for land procurement.
- 1 April 1960 - Begin construction.
- 1 May 1960 - Begin recruiting of staff.
- 1 June 1960 - Begin training of staff.
- 30 June 1960 - Beneficial occupancy.
- 1 July 1960 - Begin on-the-job training.
- 1 August 1960 - Deadline for arrival of regular U.S. staff.
- 1 September 1960 - Commence service to Washington and London.
- 1 October 1960 - Commence service to Govt. of Nigeria.

b. Key Personnel - To be selected from FBID classified roster.

c. Indigenous Personnel - Nigerians will be recruited to the extent they qualify for monitoring and support positions. French monitors will in all likelihood be imported, and it may be necessary to import other foreign nationals as keymen around whom can be developed indigenous English and vernacular monitoring staffs. As the bulk of monitoring will be in English and French, competency in these languages is most important. An indigenous radio technician will also be needed, but other indigenous types will be clerical and ancillary.

d. Targets - All broadcasting stations in the area of Map I, Tab C.

e. Duration - Permanent.

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
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- b. Training: Bureau will conduct own monitor training course along established FBIS lines.
- c. Material: All technical equipment will have to be procured in the U.S. and shipped to site. Only basic construction materials are available locally.
- d. Communications: Commercial facilities will be employed to London, and existing FBIS facilities from London to Washington. The full file will be dropped to BBC Caversham.



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- f. Support required from other U.S. agencies:
 - (1) Negotiations with Governments of United Kingdom and Nigeria by the Department of State. This support has been verbally assured by Department of State officials.
 - (2) Contracting and liaison service with contractors in Nigeria and with Nigerian Government by the American Consul General, Lagos. This is standard service upon certification of available funds.

11. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:

- a. Current status: A proposal, established by consumer demand and based on specific field survey work in the operating area. Technical tests and political soundings assure its feasibility. Approval and funding will enable immediate steps toward implementation.
- b. Commitments: It is understood by the host Government and by the British that the full unclassified product of the bureau would be made available to them.
- c. Effectiveness: N.A.

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d. Anticipated results: The bureau would fill a significant existing gap in coverage of Africa. Approximately 80% of transmitters in the West and Central African area (Map I, Tab C) will be monitorable at one time or another, according to test results.

e. Evaluation: The project will be evaluated by annual consumer survey and by monthly production analyses in the same manner as all FBIS field operations. No special support is required.

f. Policy questions: No new or unrefined policy questions.

g. Congress: No known Congressional implications.



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j. Special considerations: N.A.


k. Liquidation: N.A.

ATTACHMENTS:

Tab A - Summary of 1956 West African Survey

Tab B - 1957 & 1958 Consumer Poll on Africa

Tab C - Summary of 1959 West African Survey



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A

TAB A

SUMMARY OF PART II: WEST AFRICA MONITORING SURVEY

Conducted September 1956

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
Washington 25, D. C.

PART TWO: WEST AFRICA

I. Objective:

To assess (1) the nature of the coverage problem and (2) the technical potential of Accra as a site for monitoring broadcasts originating in the West African area.

II. Definition:

West Africa as referred to in this report includes those areas falling into a natural zone of regional radio conditions consonant with the objective of this study; specifically, that portion of Africa bounded more or less by longitudes 20° W and 20° E, by the Tropic of Cancer on the north and by latitude 5° S. This includes West Africa south of the Sahara, offshore islands, and portions of French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo.

III. The Facts:

A. Geographic

1. Accra has two distinct and important advantages as a potential monitoring site for West Africa. First it is as close, from a practical standpoint, as one can get to the geographic center of a natural target area, political, linguistic and radio receptionwise. Secondly it has an atypical climate unique to the area, characterized by favorable habitability for white people and by a lack of the frequent severe local electrical disturbances which hamper monitoring at many other West African points. Rain-fall between 100 and 200 inches per year and 100 days per year with numerous thunderstorms is the rule along the Guinea Coast, but at Accra the average is respectively only 27 inches and 11 days per year, minimum for the inhabited area. Temperatures run in the 70's and 80's normally, with high humidity.

2. Accra lies about 1100 miles southeast of Dakar and the same distance northwest of Brazzaville-Leopoldville, the extreme regional targets. Most of the targets fall in the range 200-800 mi., just beyond the limits which most of these tropical band transmissions are designed to cover. For the frequencies involved the propagational cut-off of reception is very sharp around the periphery of the area, and more distant African broadcasters are not normally audible.

B. Linguistic

1. Since West Africa has been almost entirely under the control of the principal West European powers, the development of broadcasting in its first decade (1935-1945) emphasized service to the European settlers and local literates in the European languages; this served mainly as a supplement to the not always reliable reception from the mother country. In the past decade (1946-1956) such factors as enlightened colonial policy, increased education, nationalist aspirations, and Islamic expansionism have created a need for broadcasting to the indigenous populations. Where ten years ago there was no vernacular broadcasting in West Africa, today there are broadcasts in 45 indigenous languages and dialects.

2. This rapid development has nevertheless only scratched the surface, for the bulk of the area population still lacks access to radio receivers, wired outlets, or public distribution speakers. Furthermore, there remain millions of inhabitants speaking more than 300 additional languages and dialects for whom programming as well as technical facilities need be developed before they are adequately reached. Broadcasting problems, which are already complicated, are potentially far more so.

3. The total population of this West African area is estimated to be at least 77,000,000. It is estimated that the 45 vernaculars already employed in broadcasts are spoken by 43,000,000 persons. In contrast the 5 European languages employed are spoken by less than 2,000,000 persons. Although the long-range implications seem clear, the fact remains that the ratio of languages used is nine vernaculars for one European; the program output ratio is five hours European for every one of vernacular. There seems little doubt the European languages will dominate broadcasting for some years simply because there are no better linguistic common denominators in the area.

C. Technical

1. Domestic wireless broadcasting in West Africa has developed on short-wave as is traditional in the tropics. High static levels which normally prevail make use of medium-wave impractical for distance coverage, although in the past few years use of low power medium-wave transmitters for local urban coverage has become increasingly popular. The skip phenomenon, which usually negates the usefulness of short-wave for regional broadcasting, has been circumvented by the use of special antenna designs with 3 and 4 megacycle band transmissions, providing a continuous strong signal blanket over a relatively limited area. These bands are so much lower than the tropical MUF and OMF for international transmission that interference normally does not occur between them nor among the several tropical broadcast zones around the world.

2. Almost every country and territory broadcasting in West Africa has adopted this system, totally or in part. This is one important reason why monitoring of the area cannot be accomplished satisfactorily outside of the area, and why some transmitters are not easily monitored even within the area. Tropical band broadcasting seems to be a firmly established pattern in West Africa, and there is every indication that it will remain so for some considerable time.

3. Locations of the various broadcasting stations in the target area are shown below, along with statistics on their output and average monitorability in the Accra area.

("Bulletins" refers to news, comment, press reviews, etc. including regional or local information.)

<u>Bloc</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>No. of Languages</u>	<u>No. Daily Bulletins</u>	<u>No. Bulletins Monitorable</u>	<u>Reception</u>
Independent	Accra	7	15	15	Excellent
"	Monrovia	7	3	3	Very good
British	Lagos	4	8	8	Excellent
"	Ibadan	5	2½	2½	Very good
"	Enugu	4	3	3	Good
"	Kaduna	6	2½	2½	Good
"	Freetown	3	4*	3	Fair/Good
French	Dakar**	7	15	12	Very good
"	St. Louis	4	3*	0	nil
"	Conakry	1*	2	0	nil
"	Abidjan	4	8	7	Good
"	Lome	3	4*	3*	Fair/Good
"	Cotonou	5	7	6	Good
"	Douala	3	3½	1½	Fair
"	Yaounde	3	3½	2½	Good
"	Brazzaville	4	1		Good
"	Fort Lamy	4	3	2	Fair
Belgian	Leopoldville***9		10	10	Very good
Portuguese	Bissau	1	2	2	Fair/Good
"	Cape Verde**	1			Fair
"	Sao Tome	1	2	2	Fair/Good
Spanish	Fernando Po	4	4	0	Very poor
"	Bata	1	1	0	Poor

* unconfirmed

** two stations

*** three stations

D. Logistics

1. There is ample space around Accra suitable for a monitoring operation; avoiding interference sources as the airport and the relatively few local radio transmitters presents no great problem. On recommendation of the American Consulate no time and effort was wasted in seeking specific potential sites during the survey. Because of land title problems, the appropriate time to do this is after a decision is made to act.

2. Poles are locally available for antenna masts, but virtually all other construction materials and equipment must be imported.

3. Action moves leisurely in Ghana and maximum leadtime is usually necessary. Labor costs tend to look deceptively low if allowance is not made for the larger labor force required for most operation than is the rule in certain other areas in which FBIS operates. Housing for new residents is very scarce and for transient visitors most difficult. The Ambassador Hotel, completed for Independence Day this month, is the hotel of Accra; the Ringway, a small older hotel, is also acceptable. Reportedly reservations must still be made well in advance, the earlier the better.

4. Construction costs in general run slightly lower than in the United States. Figures vary with type, size and standards of construction and refurbishing, but the most commonly applied figure for an acceptable class of structure appropriate to this problem is 3 pounds per square foot, equal to \$8.50 per square foot. Reliable electric power (230v.) is available at many locations.

5. A vehicle for transportation of personnel must be provided any new operation. All principal necessities and amenities are available in Accra.

6. Satisfactory telegraphic communication exists to London and New York. The regular, government and press rates to New York are \$0.23, 0.115 and 0.065 respectively and to London \$0.18, 0.09 and 0.045 respectively. Good air service to West Europe exists via BOAC, Safari, Air France and PAA. Although port conditions at Accra limit handling to small freight, anything else can be handled through Takoradi or the nearby new port of Tema. Shipping is relatively frequent and expeditious.

IV. Discussion:

A. The physical advantages of Accra are evident. Comprehensive regional monitoring of West Africa would be very difficult without favorable climatic features. Even so, monitoring, much of which needs be done after darkness, is by no means an easy task. The "tropical band" transmissions are within the high frequency spectrum

affected by unstable ionospheric layer conditions prevalent at night over tropical Africa and causing the ubiquitous flutter-fade which chops most signals in varying degrees.

B. Ideally, to realize maximum return from the monitoring effort, diversity reception should be employed. This would at least double the cost of antennas and equipment, would increase operating expenses, and would inherently complicate technical and operational requirements. The extra investment might not in practice yield a sufficiently better product to justify the cost and effort. Therefore it would seem best to install a conventional facility, planning it with a potential for developing to a diversity basis if later required. The fade condition should receive technical study, as other means of combatting it may be learned or developed experimentally.

C. A five-position monitoring station, with an added position for cruising (search) operations and another for press intercept, should be adequate to handle coverage in the immediately foreseeable future. Two-shift operation, 0530-1330 and 1630-0030 GMT, with a few people bridging the gap by working a standard day shift, would enable coverage of everything of possible interest and value. The small, compact monitoring staff is achieved because no great vernacular versatility seems required at this time.

D. The 45 indigenous languages still constitute a minor portion of the total output when compared with the time devoted to the several European languages. Projecting curves of the development of vernacular versus European programming into the next decade, it would appear that vernacular programming will overtake European language programming. However certain factors may increasingly tend to slow the vernacular trend, particularly the cost of multiple-language services and the indispensability of the European language programming. The past, present and future dominance of the latter should strengthen the position of both English and French as a lingua franca, for which the need will become greater as regional intercourse develops. Thus it is considered that the next decade will tend to approach a balanced situation between European and vernacular output by total volume, though not by individual language importance.

E. Fortunately vernacular broadcasting in West Africa is still in a relatively early stage of development, and there is extensive duplication and repetitiveness between it and European programming. An efficient, comprehensive monitoring operation can be conducted in the European languages, mainly English and French, and may be expected to remain the nucleus of effort for at least the next decade, and undoubtedly for longer. This does not preclude the possible value of some vernacular monitoring, but demonstrates that staffing can be essentially uncomplicated and economical. Development of vernacular monitoring may proceed on a conservative basis without Quixotic effort and expense being wasted jousting what superficially appears

to be a burgeoning challenger. Nevertheless, development of vernacular broadcasting must be kept under careful surveillance and needs for it reviewed periodically.

V. Conclusions:

A. West Africa comprises a distinct radio broadcasting zone, both in terms of reception and vernacular languages.

B. Successful comprehensive monitoring of West Africa can be accomplished only within the area, and Accra appears to have the best potential among practicable sites.

C. A small but specific body of broadcast local and regional information flowing with reasonable regularity is available for monitoring.

D. A productive and economical monitoring operation can be based on principal effort in the several European languages. The complicated vernacular situation will not pose an early threat to the efficiency of this operation.

E. If the Government of Ghana is going to undertake international broadcasts to Africa, as is presently intended, it will have a need for West African monitoring.

VI. Recommendation:

From a technical and non-political viewpoint the Accra area should be considered not only an adequate location but also the most practicable and desirable for basing a West African monitoring operation, provided appropriate caution is exercised with respect to location of local radio transmitting facilities.

B

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, FBID

DATE: 14 January 1959

FROM : Chief, Field Operations Staff

SUBJECT: African Broadcast Monitoring

REF : Memorandum dated 17 October 1958 from the Assistant Director for Operations to selected U.S. Government Offices, Subject: African Broadcast Monitoring.

1. The reference memorandum was transmitted to 17 potential consumers of African Broadcast Monitoring. This was the second such consumer survey, the first having been completed 21 October 1957. At that time a twofold decision was reached: 1) the degree of interest among potential users of African coverage did not warrant the establishment of new monitoring facilities in the face of existing budgetary and other practical limitations; and 2) operational planning for this project would be suspended for one year. Also, a series of inquiries to the BBC during the year pressed the British as to their African interests and plans, and the reply has been included with survey results.

2. The responses to the 17 October 1958 survey have been encouraging and generally have indicated a more intense, more positive, and more enlightened interest in the project. To assist evaluation of the replies, strong indications have been tabulated as A priority, moderate indications as B priority and weak or minor indications as C priority; negative interest as N. (See attachments A and B.) By combining A and B priorities into a single unit we find the following significant changes in respect to interest in target areas as gauged by the number of preference for Zone I (North Africa), II (West Africa) and III (East and Central Africa):

	<u>Zone I</u>	<u>Zone II</u>	<u>Zone III</u>
	<u>(Number of Preferences)</u>		
1958 Survey	7	13	8
1957 Survey	7	5	5

Considering the A priority alone, the difference between the two surveys are as follows:

	<u>Zone I</u>	<u>Zone II</u>	<u>Zone III</u>
	<u>(Number of Preferences)</u>		
1958 Survey	5	6	4
1957 Survey	7	2	1

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3. From either of the above comparisons the increased interest in Zone II as the primary target in three possible areas is quite apparent -- a 240% increase, using the first basis for comparison, and 300% using the other. A slightly decreased interest in Zone I is apparent from the second comparison. Interest in broadcasts from and to East Africa has increased almost to the level of North African interest.

4. Not only has the reaction been altered quantitatively, but the substantive comment has also been more meaningful. In some cases this more positive approach has served to alter preferences made by some offices in the first survey; in other cases the comment clearly strengthened preferences which remained unchanged from the first survey. A sampling of these excerpted comments follows:

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

"Primary attention should continue to be devoted to North Africa... There is however increasing need for monitoring the broadcasts of West Africa where rapid political evolution is taking place... more coverage of the East African area is recommended."

Assistant Director for National Estimates

"We continue to believe that an increase of FBIS reporting on Africa could provide a significant amount of intelligence on the area. The expansion of radio facilities in West Africa, and increased emissions from Cairo lead us to believe that the net gains to be obtained from additional monitoring activity in Africa south of the Sahara are becoming increasingly important. This, when considered with the generally low coverage given African developments by the intelligence community as a whole, provides further justification for the extension of monitoring facilities in this area."

Director, Office of Intelligence Research and Coordination/State

"Inasmuch as North African Coverage is now adequate, it appears that West Africa should be given priority in any plan for extending radio monitoring operations in Africa."

"In view of the forthcoming inauguration of the Ghana External Service (scheduled for 1959) and the rapid pace of political developments, especially in the French territories, the Intelligence Bureau of the Department feels there will be a definite need for increased radio monitoring of Zone II (West Africa) within the next year. Moreover, since expansion of Foreign Service posts will probably not be able to match the scope and speed of political activity in this area in the foreseeable future, FBIS monitoring would offer the only suitable means available for covering a complex area."

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Director, Office of Research and Intelligence/USIA

"We would now assign equal secondary priority to Zone II (West Africa) primarily because of the rapid political evolution of the area - specifically French Africa - which suggest that independent transmissions, no longer under French control, will soon be forthcoming from much of this area, i.e., Guinea and Sudan. The development of the Pan-African movement presently centered in Accra emphasizes the previously stated necessity of monitoring the proposed external transmissions of Ghana. Monitoring of Nigerian transmissions will increase in importance as independence nears."

Operations Coordinating Board

"...OCB's interest in Africa has been intensified in a number of concrete ways during the past year. We now have a fulltime senior staff member, [redacted] who works on that area. OCB has or shortly 25X1 will have papers covering every country in Africa... . With the actual inception of work on these papers OCB's interest in African Broadcast monitoring has naturally increased. In areas where your material is available it is most valuable... ."

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

"...developments in the Near East and adjacent areas during this period have led to a quickening of interest in certain African areas in some important elements of the Office. For example, the rapid economic and political developments since 1957 have led to a steadily increasing interest in the nature, extent, and probable impact of Soviet economic penetration activities upon selected areas of Africa, especially West Africa. In terms of geographic intelligence needs, the increasing number of independent entities in East and West Africa suggests that there will be a greater need for studies involving one or more aspects of unconventional warfare. Some of these would include assessment of local feelings, and political activities and aspirations. There appears to be a trend toward "neutralism", and in some cases, animosity, toward the west, which will probably lead to a reduction in the ability of field personnel to obtain and to report significant information. In light of these developments, any improvement in FBIS coverage which might add to our knowledge or compensate for deficiencies in conventional reporting, would be most helpful."

Head of BBC Monitoring Service

"After much consideration our official consumers here have at last expressed intense interest in monitoring (East Africa), particularly in the African languages... ."

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"...North Africa in particular is an area in which we feel...there could be some development (in monitoring)."

4. Aside from monitoring transmitters located within the several coverage areas, potential users have also indicated specific interest in external transmissions beamed to specific areas throughout the African continent. This is especially true of State's Bureau of African Affairs which is particularly interested in propaganda broadcasts from Egypt, India, other Middle Eastern or Soviet bloc areas directed toward countries of Africa south of the Sahara, and Radio Cairo broadcasts to the Maghreb and to the Horn. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ONE and USIA also indicated strong interest in the pressures exerted by Cairo Radio in specific areas of the African continent. In addition, State [REDACTED] expressed interest in monitoring coverage of Zone IV (South Africa).

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5. Of the 18 "consumers" solicited, two of whom are not regular users of FBIS service, five (28%) produced entirely negative responses: OBI, OCR, OSO (Defense Department), AFCIN, and NSA.

6. The foregoing summarizes the reaction of potential consumers of African coverage solicited in the second survey. Aggregately, they have evinced a far stronger interest than in 1957. The turn of political events, the persistent clamor for independence on the part of African colonies, the growing solidarity of African blocs, and plans for increased radio broadcasting services throughout the African continent, notably Ghana, have all left their mark in the thinking being done among U.S. intelligence agencies. These circumstances have also led to a definite shift in emphasis from North Africa to West Africa in respect to area coverage priorities. A requirement for action in West Africa is clearly indicated.

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ATTACHMENTS:

- A. Tabulation of Zones and Priorities - 1958 Survey
- B. Tabulation of Zones and Priorities - 1957 Survey

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
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ATTACHMENT A

1958 Survey

Zones and Priorities

<u>Organization</u>		<u>I</u> <u>North Africa</u>	<u>II</u> <u>West Africa</u>	<u>III</u> <u>East Africa</u>
<u>CIA</u>	OBI	N	N	N
	OCI	A	B	C
	OCR	N	N	N
	ONE	C	A	B
	ORR	A	B	C



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<u>DEFENSE</u>	OSO	N	N	N
	ACSI	C	A	B
	AFCIN	N	N	N
	ONI	N	B	A
<u>STATE</u>	NE/A	A	B	C
	OIRC	B	A	C
<u>OTHER</u>	NSA	N	N	N
	OCB	A	B	A
	USIA	A	B	B
	BBC	B	B	A

A - 5	A - 6	A - 3
B - 2	B - 7	B - 6
C - 5	C - 0	C - 4
N - 6	N - 5	N - 5


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ATTACHMENT B

1957 Survey

Zones and Priorities

<u>Organization</u>		<u>I</u> <u>North Africa</u>	<u>II</u> <u>West Africa</u>	<u>III</u> <u>East Africa</u>
<u>CIA</u>	OBI	N	N	N
	OCI	A	B	C
	OCR	N	N	N
	ONE	C	A	B
	ORR	A	N	N



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<u>DEFENSE</u>	OSO	N	N	N
	ACSI	N	A	C
	AFCIN	N	N	N
	ONI	N	B	A
<u>STATE</u>	NE/A	A	N	N
	OIRC	N	N	N
<u>OTHER</u>	NSA	A	N	N
	OCB	A	C	B
	USIA	A	C	B
	BBC	B	B	A
		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
		A - 7	A - 2	A - 2
		B - 1	B - 4	B - 3
		C - 1	C - 2	C - 3
		N - 8	N - 9	N - 9



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TAB C

TAB C - SUMMARY OF WEST AFRICAN TRIP - JULY 1959

During the month of July 1959, FBIS conducted a survey of Northern Nigeria and Liberia, areas which are considered politically and technically suitable for the establishment of a monitoring station.

Cities visited in Northern Nigeria included Jos, Kaduna, Zaria, and Kano, and in Liberia, the Robertsfield area.

Reception results generally indicate that any one of the areas tested is suitable for monitoring the main transmitters of West and Central Africa after dark.

Atmospheric disturbances were fewer during the test period in Liberia than Nigeria, and because of Liberia's location, the most western African transmitters are received better there. This fact will become less important, however, when Guinea, the most important target in the area, completes the planned installation of high power transmitters. Good reception of Conakry should then be possible from Nigeria.

Nigeria is a better area from which to cover Central African broadcasts, not only because of its proximity, but because reception of the tropic band frequencies is best after dark, and darkness arrives in Nigeria more than an hour before it does in Liberia.

Serious interference to broadcast monitoring in Liberia could be caused by the large Voice of America relay station planned for installation near Monrovia in 1961. Other considerations which make Liberia a less favorable location for a monitoring station than Nigeria are: the absence of any rental quarters in the Robertsfield area, which necessitates the outlay of a large sum for construction of housing for both African and U.S. personnel; employment of a special staff for housing and operations building maintenance; high communication rates between Liberia and U.S., and poor, costly communications to London (communications between Nigeria and London benefit from Commonwealth preference rates); and the morale problem which might arise from the isolation of the Robertsfield area.

Of the areas visited in Nigeria, radio reception at Jos was best during the test; however, it has the highest incidence of disruptive atmospheric noise in the Northern Region. British communications engineers who have worked throughout the Northern Region state that atmospherics cause less interference with reception in areas north of the Plateau, because of the shorter rainy season and lower frequency of electrical storms. Also, Jos is dependent on vulnerable landline communications.

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Zaria appeared to be the most pleasant place to live among Nigeria's limited choices, and it has more favorable atmospheric conditions from a radio standpoint as well; however, because of its dependence on unreliable landline communications to Kaduna, it is not recommended. Lagos and Kano, while having communication advantages, are least suitable climatically.

Kaduna has climatic and radio conditions more resembling Zaria than Jos. Intercept was adequate of all normally significant targets except Conakry. There follows a summary of current target broadcast output and its monitorability in the Kaduna area:

<u>Bloc</u>	<u>Source Station</u>	<u>No. of Languages</u>	<u>No. Daily Bulletins</u>	<u>No. Bulletins Monitorable</u>	<u>Reception At Kaduna</u>
Independent	Accra	8	18	18	Good
	Monrovia	10 plus	4 plus	3 plus	Fair
	Conakry	3	4 plus	0	Poor to Nil (Intf)
British	Lagos	4	12	12	Good
	Ibadan	4	2 plus	2 plus	Good
	Enugu	3	4	4	Good
	Kaduna	6	3	3	Excellent
	Freetown	9	4	0	Poor to Nil (Intf)
French	Dakar **	11	14	10	Very Good
	St Louis	4	4	2	Fair *
	Abidjan	8	10	6	Fair
	Lome	5	6	4	Fair
	Cotonou	6	9	3	Fair *
	Douala	4	8	4	Fair *
	Garoua	4	7	3	Fair *
	Yaounde	2	8	3	Fair *
	Brazzaville **	8	22	18	Good
	Fort Lamy	4	5	3	Fair
	Bamako	5	5	2	Fair *
	Niamey	3	5	3	Good *
	Bangui	2	3	2	Fair *
Belgian	Leopoldville ***	9	20	15	Good
Portuguese	Bissau	1	2	0	Poor to Nil
	Sao Tome	1	2	1	Fair *

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<u>Bloc</u>	<u>Source Station</u>	<u>No. of Languages</u>	<u>No. Daily Bulletins</u>	<u>No. Bulletins Monitorable</u>	<u>Reception At Kaduna</u>
Portuguese	Cape Verde ***	1	3	0	Poor to Nil
Spanish	Fernando Po	4	5	3	Fair *
	Bata	1	2	1	Fair *

* Estimate based on limited observation

** Two stations in same city

*** Three stations in same city

Kaduna, which is the capital of Northern Nigeria, has some available African housing for rental and has contractors who are willing to build European-type housing for short-term lease. This would minimize the initial cost of the station's establishment. In addition to the housing and reception factors, Kaduna has the following unique advantages: direct high-quality, low-cost VHF radio communications link with Lagos, the international communications terminal; proximity of the American Consulate, which can provide some administrative support; special school facilities which are to be completed in 1961; and the ease of maintaining liaison with the Regional government, which appeared favorably disposed to an FBIS operation.


For these reasons Kaduna is recommended as the best location for the West African Bureau.

ATTACHMENTS:


- Map I - The West and Central African Target Area
- II - Metropolitan Plan of Greater Kaduna

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TAB E

COST ESTIMATES - KADUNA

The following cost figures are based on the building construction at Kaduna starting 1 April 1960, recruiting and training of monitoring staff to begin 1 June and the bureau to be in operation by early Fall.

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